Russian (Soviet) armaments production in the Second World War.
Following are tables of the annual Russian (Soviet) armaments production (excluding ammunition) and a comparison of the necessary strategic raw materials.
Russian (Soviet) armaments production by weapon types
Annual Soviet production figures of the main arms and military equipment (without ammunition) during the Second World War from 1939-1945:
Tanks and AFV’s:
|Tank type||1939||1940||1941||1942||1943||1944||1945 (6 months)||TOTAL|
|obsolete tanks||2,950 (incl. T-26, BT, T-28)||125||-||-||-||-||-||125 (+2,950)|
|T-26 (all variants)||?||1,549||-||-||-||-||-||1,549|
|Type of Weapon||1939||1940||1941||1942||1943||1944||1945 (6 months)||TOTAL|
|Artillery (including Anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns)||17,348||15,300||42,300||127,000||130,000||122,400||62,000||516,648|
|Machine guns||1,477,400 (1939-45)||?||?||?||?||?||?||1,477,400|
|Sub-machine guns||-||-||c.5,000,000 (1941-45)||?||?||?||?||c.5,000,000|
|Military trucks and Lorries||?||?||?||30,400||45,600||52,600||68,500||197,100+|
|Ground attack planes||-||-||1,543||8,219||11,177||11,110||c.5,500||37,549|
|Transport and liaison aircraft||?||1,691||3,091||3,298||3,744||5,508||?||17,322+|
|Trainers and miscellaneous military types||?||549||267||457||1,260||1,528||?||4,061+|
|Merchant shipping tonnage||?||?||?||?||?||?||?||?|
Raw material production for the military weapon production above:
Annual strategic raw material production (m. metric tons):
|Aluminium (in 1.000 metric tons - especially important for aircraft production)||?||?||?||51.7||62.3||82.7||86.3|
References and literature
World War II – A Statistical Survey (John Ellis)
Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two (Steven J. Zaloga, James Grandsen)
Krieg der Panzer (Piekalkiewicz)
Der 2. Weltkrieg (C. Bertelsmann Verlag)
Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume I – IIIB (Nigel Askey)
2 thoughts on “Russian arms production”
How did Soviet artillery production compare to the Germans in quantitative terms?
Talking about Soviet aircraft production is little bit complex when without lend lease technology and such low aluminium production they won’t have produced more than 50,000 -60,000 aircraft. When Harry Hopkins first time in 1941 visited Moscow and asked Stalin what Soviets need more than anything else The Generalissimo replied: “aluminium”. There are also interesting details revealed by Boris Kavalerchik in his book “Tanks of Operation Barbarossa: Soviet versus German Armour on the Eastern Front ” like that T-34/85 could not be manufactured until the Americans sent machinery via lend lease capable of making turret rings larger than the standard size already in the T-34/76. The only set of machinery capable of manufacturing different size turret rings was lost in Kharkov when the Germans captured the city. The remaining tank factories could produce designs already in existence, but they could not machine new turret rings. It made me wonder if the adoption of turretless Soviet self-propelled guns prior to 1944 might have been influenced by this situation.
What official Soviet history is not eager to talk about is problems of Soviet to increase fast their own oil production from late 1942. The increase was just 2% in 1½ years. The ammo production was lacking behind numbers of all kind of artillery which could have been seen on Kursk statistics: while Soviet had 1.8 times more artillery and mortars, Germans could fire 2.2 times more shells weight (51,083 tons vs. 21,867 tons)